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BOOK REVIEWS 259 
by nature,' strengthening 'the natural principles [e.g., conscience] against 
those things that tend to stupify [sic] it and to hinder its free exercise'" (p. 
42; the bracketed interpolations are Wainwright's). Special grace is extend-
ed only to God's elect and it is by its infusion that they become regenerate, 
with all that that entails, epistemically and otherwise. 
9. For more on this, see the last section of my "Starting from Scripture," 
op. cit. As I say there, in Scripture the heart stands for the center of our per-
sonalities, the seat and source of all our powers-rational, volitional, emo-
tional, and spiritual-and as such it ultimately determines what we believe, 
feel, do, and say. Consequently, throughout Scripture its change is singled 
out as the central and decisive factor in saving belief. 
10. So the full picture, according to Edwards, is this: 
there is given to those that are regenerated, a new supernatural sense, 
that is as it were a certain divine spiritual taste, which is in its whole 
nature diverse from any former kinds of sensation of the mind, as tast-
ing is diverse from any of the other five senses, and ... something is 
perceived by a true saint in the exercise of this new sense of mind, in 
spiritual and divine things, as entirely different from anything that is 
perceived in them by natural men, as the sweet taste of honey is 
diverse from the ideas men get of honey by looking on it or feeling of 
it [RA, 259f.]. 
11. Jonathan Edwards, Ethical Writings (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1989), p. 540. This is found in the second of Edwards's 
Two Dissertations, entitled, The Nature of True Virtue. The first dissertation is 
the previously cited Dissertation concerning the end for which Cod created the 
world. In the sentence after the one quoted in the text, Edwards says that 
true virtue, "perhaps to speak more accurately, ... is that consent, propensi-
ty and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a 
general good will." 
Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Beliefby Jerome I. 
Gellman. Cornell University Press, 1997. Pp. x and 211. $32.50 (cloth) 
JOHN ZEIS, Canisius College 
As the author states in the Preface, "This book was written from the con-
viction that in an impressive number of instances God has been and con-
tinues to be known in experience"(p. ix). Gellman's book is an articula-
tion of an argument that on the basis of the apparent experiences of God, 
it is rational to believe that God exists. A convenient way to view 
Gellman's project is as an attempt at a synthesis and strengthening of 
the arguments from religious experience found in the works of Richard 
Swinburne in The Existence of God and William Alston in Perceiving God. 
Like Swinburne, he relies heavily upon a version of the Principle of 
Credulity. Unlike Swinburne, and like Alston, Gellman argues that 
apparent perceptions of God are sufficient on their own to show the 
rationality of belief in God. Gellman thinks that he provides a successful 
argument for a strong rationality thesis which leads him, unlike Alston, 
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to draw from it the conclusion that God exists. However, I will argue 
that he is not successful in providing a satisfactory argument for his 
strong rationality thesis. 
This is what I take to be the argument scheme which is the subject of 
the book. 
eThere is a large number and significant array of purported experi-
ences, each of which seems on a phenomenal basis to be an expe-
rience of God (pp. 51,53) 
e If a person has an experience which seems (phenomenally) to be 
of a God, then everything else being equal the best explanation of 
the person's having the experience is that the person has experi-
enced God (p. 46) [Principle BEE applied to experience of God.!] 
eIf a person has an experience which seems (phenomenally) to be 
of God, then our belief that the person's having experienced God 
is the best explanation (everything else being equal) of the experi-
ence, is strengthened in proportion to the number of purported 
experiences of God there are in proportion to the variability of 
circumstances in which such experiences occur (pp. 52-53) 
[Principle STING applied to experience of God.2] 
Therefore, that God is experienced (and hence exists) is the best 
explanation of purported experiences of God, and hence it is 
strongly rational to believe that God exists and not rational to 
believe that God does not exist. 
This is what I take to be the general outline of Gellman's argument, but 
am not sure that is the way that other readers will see it, nor the way 
that Gellman himself sees it, for what I found perplexing was that 
Gellman himself never lays out the argument. This may be a reason 
why Gellman calls it an "argument scheme rather than an argument"(p. 
5), although this is not the reason he states. In any case, it would have 
been better if Gellman had offered us his own outline of the argument or 
the argument scheme, and the problems which I will discuss below are, 
to a large extent, problems predicated upon the unclarity of the way in 
which the main argument is supposed to proceed. 
Besides a few preliminaries in Chapter 1 and the presentation of the 
argument in Chapter 2, the remainder of the book is primarily taken up 
with trying to show that the "everything else being equal" clause in 
Principle BEE used in the main argument is indeed the case. One of the 
best things about this book is that there is some valuable and insightful 
consideration of issues relevant to philosophy of religion in every chap-
ter. Gellman is obviously a philosopher with original and mature ideas 
on the subjects he covers in this book. 
In Chapter I, Gellman delineates what he will take to be an experi-
ence of God, and what he takes to be the meaning of the word "God". 
Like Alston, he takes an experience of God to be a perception of God 
and he construes the perception of God as analogous to sense percep-
tion. Readers who are sympathetic to a perceptual account of the experi-
ence of God will probably find the discussion quite reasonable and use-
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ful. Of more general interest and value in Chapter 1 seems to me to be 
Gellman's discussion of the meaning of the word "God". He defends a 
theory of the name of God which entails that "God" is a proper name, 
and hence a rigid designator, but that naming takes place within a 
"naming game" which confers conditions upon an object named. The 
naming game sets parameters around what the kind of thing is which is 
being named. One of the interesting features of Gellman's thesis con-
cerning the parameters for "God" is that it not necessarily be taken to 
entail that God be an absolutely perfect being. 
In Chapter 3 Gellman defends his version of the Principle of 
Credulity, Principle BEE, against objections which were put forth by 
Michael Martin and William Rowe in opposition to Swinburne's 
Principle of Credulity. I thought he effectively blunts Martin's criticisms 
of the Principle of Credulity, but I do not think that he is quite as suc-
cessful responding to Rowe's objection. It seems to me that Gellman 
successfully shows that Rowe's objection is not conclusive, but it does 
not seem to me that he is successful in showing that Rowe's objections or 
others like it do not create sufficient doubt to discredit his strong ratio-
nality thesis. Gellman's strong rationality thesis is that on the basis of 
religious experience, it is rational to believe that God exists and not 
rational to believe that God does not exist (p. 2). I will return to this 
issue at the conclusion of this review. At the close of Chapter 3, he 
addresses the question of whether or not our belief that God exists on 
the basis of the phenomenal evidence must be less rational than our 
belief that physical objects exist. Gellman examines a couple of theses of 
what he calls "commensurate rationality" and argues quite aggressively 
that even if it is granted that there is more evidence for the existence of 
physical objects than there is for the existence of God, it does not follow 
that this implies that it is less rational to believe that God exists on the 
basis of the evidence than it is to believe that physical objects exist on the 
basis of the evidence. Gellman's rationale here is that there "could be a 
ceiling beyond which rationality would no longer increase despite incre-
ments in likelihood" (p. 85) and that it could very well be that evidence 
for the experience of God has reached that ceiling. I think readers will 
find this discussion quite stimulating and controversial. 
In Chapter 4, Gellman discusses a number of different objections to 
phenomenal evidence of God which are prompted by the consideration 
of religious diversity. He discusses the alleged incompatibility of report-
ed experiences of God and he offers a number of plausible considera-
tions which would explain the reported incompatibilities from both the 
subjective and the objective end of the experience. I did think that one 
proposed explanation of reported incompatibilities which Gellman 
offered was disturbing. In responding to the charge of incompatible rev-
elations, Gellman suggests that God could reveal falsehoods; this seems 
to me to be a bad route to take, and his justification confuses the distinc-
tion between doing and allowing (p. 98). But my objection to Gellman 
here is rather trifling, for this chapter is loaded with all sorts of sound, 
thought-provoking discussions. What is particularly good is the way in 
which Gellman attempts to adjudicate the conflict between the experi-
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ence of the deity as an impersonal, infinite being, say, like Brahman, 
with the experience of the deity as a personal God. His suggestion is 
that God is both. "God, then, is not only a personal being. He is also an 
inexhaustible being, possessed of an inexhaustible, hidden plenitude, 
save for that part of the plenitude with whose open, revealed presence 
the subject is graced" (p. 118). He applies this approach very nicely also 
to explain why experiences of God are often described as ineffable. If 
God's presence has these dual aspects (one as inexhaustible, hidden 
plenitude, the other as supreme person) it would explain why there are 
widely variant ways of describing the experience. 
Various versions of reductionist objections are considered by Gellman 
in Chapter 5. And in the last two chapters, Gellman considers the posi-
tive evidence for God's nonexistence. Successful refutation of the evi-
dence for God's nonexistence is critical to Gellman's thesis, for his posi-
tion is that belief in God is "strongly rational" and this entails that it is 
rational to believe that God exists and not rational to believe that God 
does not exist (at least on some applications of the canons of rationality). 
Hence, unless he can show that the atheological arguments are without 
merit, he wouldn't be able to get the strong rationality thesis; he'd only 
at best get the weak rationality thesis. In Chapter 6, he addresses pur-
ported proofs of God's non-existence based upon the self-inconsistency 
of the concept of God. In Chapter 7, the final chapter of the book, he 
addresses the problem of evil. In both of these chapters, he offers valu-
able, original contributions. 
His argument in Chapter 6 against the charges of self-inconsistency is 
quite simple but good. He points out that the concept of God can be 
understood on different tiers of particularization. So even if it were 
shown that omnipotence is self-inconsistent or that omnipotence was 
inconsistent with omnibenevolence, this would only show that an 
omnipotent being could not exist or that an omnipotent, omnibenevo-
lent being could not exist. But this would not show that God could not 
exist. God is the perfect being, but theists need only be committed to a 
quite generic notion of the perfect being (as set by the parameters of the 
naming game from Chapter 1), not a being who must be omnipotent, or 
even a being who must be absolutely perfect in power, knowledge, and 
goodness. Those who are fans of the Anselmian notion of God, or any-
thing resembling it, as setting the parameter for the concept of God 
would not be predisposed to accept Gellman's argument. But I am one 
of those fans of the Anselmian notion of God, and I was impressed by 
his argument in Chapter 6, particularly when complemented by his dis-
cussion on the name of God in Chapter 1. 
Gellman's argument in Chapter 7 against the problem of evil is a bold 
one. He argues that the problem of evil, in either its logical or proba-
bilistic form, provides no evidence at all against God's existence. He 
rightly focuses most of the discussion on the probabilistic version of the 
argument, and particularly on the version proposed by Rowe. Gellman 
proceeds to show that the success of Rowe's argument rides upon 
whether or not from the fact that it appears to us that there are no justi-
fying goods for so much suffering in the world that one can infer that we 
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have no good reason to think that God's justifying reasons for allowing 
suffering are epistemically inaccessible to us. Gellman then argues, and 
I think successfully, that Rowe's argument is unsuccessful. If we know 
that God, a perfect being, exists, and we also know that there are no 
apparent justifying goods for all the suffering in the world, we can then 
infer that the justifying goods for all the suffering in the world must be 
epistemically inaccessible to us. 
There is a wealth of thought provoking, sound, interesting discussion 
in Jerome Gellman's book, and the thesis is definitely one which is signifi-
cant and worthwhile. Unfortunately, I think that the conclusion of the 
main argument is not established by the author. As noted above, Gellman 
wishes to establish what he calls the "strong rationality" of theism. 
These are my problems with the argument as presented by Gellman. 
First, he insists that the Principle BEE is an accepted principle of rationali-
ty; and although he considers certain possibilities for discrediting experi-
ences of God as falling under the Principle, I do not think that he ade-
quately addresses the issue which bothers epistemic chauvinists like 
myself. What about those who think that principle BEE applies, but only 
to apparent experiences of physical objects? The principle can be applied 
to apparent experiences of spiritual objects, but whether it ought to be is 
something which many are quite skeptical about. Following Alston, he 
concludes consideration of this sort of objection by leveling the charge of 
epistemic imperialism (p. 70), but this is not substantive to the issue of 
whether the objection is correct or incorrect. Gellman's Principle BEE is a 
general principle which ranges indiscriminately over sorts of objects. But 
what reason is there for thinking that so general a principle as BEE is a 
canon of rationality? It seems to me that a strong case could be made that 
the only evidence we have for the general principle is what we take to be 
the case about our perception of physical objects; and if that is so, no 
principle as general as Principle BEE seems to be warranted. Maybe 
Gellman is more sensitive to this issue than is apparent on the surface, 
and this may be what is hinted at when he concedes "that at various junc-
tures of our argument a person could make reasonable applications of 
our principles different from the ones we make which would block our 
conclusion" (p. 2), but that is difficult to say because he never clearly 
identifies the various junctures and how at the various junctures the prin-
ciples could be applied differently to block the conclusion. 
This admission brings to light another problem, which is that this 
makes Gellman's position that theism is strongly rational consistent with 
the position that atheism is strongly rational. Maybe that is not so bad if 
that would mean that for some, it is rational to believe that God exists 
and not rational to believe that God does not exist, and for others, vice 
versa. However, this is not what Gellman seems to allow, for he states 
that he is arguing that belief in God is strongly rational "for everyone" 
(p. 3). Hence, it follows that if both theism and atheism are strongly 
rational, then that implies that for everyone, there are some reasonable 
applications of the canons of rationality such that it is rational to believe 
that God exists and not rational to believe that God does not exist and 
some other reasonable applications of the canons of rationality such that 
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it is rational to believe that God does not exist and not rational to believe 
that God does exist. In the book we don't find how to sort this out. My 
guess is that Gellman would insist that atheism is not strongly rational; 
and that is OK, but he hasn't given us sufficient reason for thinking that 
theism is strongly rational and atheism is not. He claims to have shown 
that it is not reasonable to believe that God does not exist (p. 3), but I did 
not find an argument for that in his book. Gellman also does not 
address what I think is an important question concerning his position. If 
not everyone perceives God, wouldn't those who do perceive God be in 
a different position epistemically from those who do not? I think that 
the best we get from Gellman is an argument for something which is a 
bit stronger than what he calls the "weak rationality" of theism; namely, 
that on some application of the canons of rationality it is rational to 
believe that God exists. This, I believe, he has shown, and in a new and 
insightful way. He would have to provide much more for us to be able 
to see the stronger conclusion. I look forward to his future efforts in that 
direction. 
NOTES 
1. Principle BEE: If a person, S, has an experience, E, which seems (phe-
nomenally) to be of a particular object, 0 (or an object of kind, K), then 
everything else being equal the best explanation of S's having E is that S has 
experienced 0 (or an object of kind, K), rather than something else or noth-
ing at all (p. 46). 
2. Principle STING: If a person,S, has an experience, E, which seems 
(phenomenally) to be of a particular object, 0 (or of an object of kind, K), 
then our belief that S's having experienced 0 (or an object of kind K) is the 
best explanation (everything else being equal) of E, is strengthened in pro-
portion to the number of purported experiences of 0 there are and in pro-
portion to the variability of circumstances in which such experiences occur 
(pp. 52-53). 
Religion and Contemporary Liberalism edited by Paul J. Weithman. 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997. Pp. viii and 315. $48.00 (cloth) 
PETER L.P. SIMPSON, City University of New York 
This book consists of a collection of essays by a distinguished cast of 
contemporary scholars. The essays are, in order: an introduction by Paul 
Weith man on Religion and the Liberalism of Reasoned Respect; Robert 
Audi on the State, the Church, and the Citizen; Sanford Levinson on 
what Liberalism demands of the Religiously Oriented Judge; Martha 
Nussbaum on Religion and Women's Human Rights; Philip Quinn on 
Political Liberalisms and the Exclusion of the Religious; Nicholas 
W olterstorff on rejecting what Liberalism tells us about Speaking and 
Acting in Public for Religious Reasons; Timothy Jackson on Liberal 
Theory and Religious Pluralism; Jorge Garcia on Liberal Theory, Human 
